Twentieth Century Chronicle

Page 233

Yamamoto's continued entanglement with the Kawahara faction in the navy not only failed to suppress them, but also ultimately placed him on the opposite side of the southward expansion strategy. This was a situation that Yamamoto, who had always been committed to promoting naval strategy, did not want to see, as it would negate all his past contributions to the navy.

Shibayama Yahachi now understands the anxiety and uncertainty that Yamamoto Gonnohyōe felt before leaving the Navy. Suppressing the Kawahara faction was Yamamoto's instinct, but facing the Kawahara faction, whose future was already tied to the Navy's, Yamamoto knew that such suppression was actually depleting the Yamamoto faction's foundation within the Navy.

Now he felt the same way when facing Lin Xinyi. Lin Xinyi had elevated the leadership of the Kawahara faction in the navy to an irreplaceable position. Anyone who wanted to fight against this faction would first have to deny the grand strategy formulated by the Kawahara faction for the navy, and he was certain that this was an impossible task.

This meeting led Shibayama Yahachi to abandon his idea of ​​confrontation with the Kawahara faction. After speaking with Hayashi Shin-yi, he secured a share of the Asian Joint Fleet, thus becoming a supporter of the Asian Alliance. Hayashi Shin-yi, through this meeting, not only gained Shibayama Yahachi's support but also secured the leading role for the reform group in this military exercise.

While the Japanese Navy was busy preparing for the trilateral military exercises in the Yellow Sea, at the end of August, Japanese Foreign Minister Makino visited Beijing. His important mission was to begin negotiations with the Chinese government on the Gando incident and, incidentally, to resolve the issue of the Korean Independence Army.

Makino personally promoted the Japan-China peace talks because it was no longer just a need of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy, but also a requirement of the new Satsuma clique to curb the Choshu faction's unilateral actions on national policy. With the commencement of the Chiba Prefecture heavy industry center project, the new Satsuma clique achieved unity on a shared interest, changing its previous fragmented state.

Although the various factions in the old Satsuma repeatedly claimed to want to integrate the power of the Satsuma clique and restore its glory, their ultimate goal in trying to unify the Satsuma clique was to make their own faction the sole leader of the Satsuma clique, which was clearly not in the interests of the other factions. Therefore, since the Satsuma War, although the Satsuma clique had made several attempts to bridge the contradictions between the military and political factions, it had never succeeded.

The fundamental reason is that the Satsuma clique during the anti-shogunate period had a unified goal, while the various factions within the Satsuma clique during the Meiji Restoration period had inconsistent political goals, making unification impossible. However, in the recent heavy industry center project in Chiba Prefecture, a new Satsuma faction has emerged, as everyone has found their own interests in this project.

For the Chiba Prefecture heavy industry center to be completed, the trilateral cooperation between Japan, China, and India could not fail. Therefore, the New Satsuma faction was a major supporter of Japan-China peace, and naturally opposed the Choshu faction, which attempted to undermine Japan-China peace to strengthen its own position. Makino was also well aware that if the Chiba Prefecture heavy industry center could be completed, it would mean that the New Satsuma faction would truly have a strong foundation, and the Choshu faction would no longer be able to control the government as it had in the past.

Driven by factional interests, Makino was forced to personally travel to Beijing in an attempt to resolve the issue before it escalated further. His trip also served another purpose: to prevent foreign powers from interfering in the Korean issue.

The Gando Incident, coupled with the The Hague envoy incident, brought the Korean Peninsula, which had already been brought under Japanese influence, back into the international spotlight. Some countries began to question the legitimacy of Japan's administration of Mindanao, using the North Korean issue as a pretext, and the previously suppressed ambitions of the Dutch began to stir again.

The Dutch East Indies effectively only occupied Java and Sumatra, and southern Borneo. They held only protectorate rights over Bali and Sulawesi, not full annexation. Because Japan, after occupying Mindanao, adopted a friendly stance towards the Denpasar dynasty in Bali and the Bonne and Gova sultanates in Sulawesi, the Dutch were deeply concerned that Japan intended to extend its influence into Bali and Sulawesi, thus exposing the core of the Dutch East Indies, Java, to the threat of the Japanese navy.

After the Napoleonic Wars, the Netherlands had completely declined. The Dutch, who had resigned themselves to being a small country in Europe, still tried to preserve their overseas colonies, as these were the source of their wealth. The Dutch overseas colonies were mainly in two areas: the Surinamese colony in the West Indies and the East Indies.

In order to protect these two overseas colonies, the Dutch still tried to keep up with the development of steam-powered warships in the second half of the 19th century. When the Dutch Navy was renamed the Royal Netherlands Navy in 1905, the Netherlands had a naval force of 10,000 men, about one-fifth or one-sixth the size of the Japanese Navy, and maintained three 3500-ton coastal defense ships, five 5000-ton coastal defense ships, and six modern 3800-ton Holland-class protected cruisers.

Such a force would indeed be an irresistible force against the indigenous people of Southeast Asia who still relied on canoes for sea voyages. However, for the Japanese navy, which had already established the Six-Six Fleet and defeated the Russian fleet in the Great Naval Battle, even if the Royal Dutch Navy were to gather all its forces in the East Indies, it would be difficult to protect the Dutch East Indies.

The Dutch had long wanted to place Bali and Sulawesi directly under the control of the Dutch East Indies government, but their own national strength was insufficient, and they faced successive challenges from Spain and Britain. As a result, the Netherlands could only retain Java, the most populous island, and Sumatra, which was geographically important, while ruling the other islands mainly as protectors.

After the Spanish-American War, Spain was forced to withdraw from Southeast Asia, and Britain began to loosen its control over the Dutch. Although the British allowed the United States to replace Spain in occupying the Philippine Islands, they did not intend to allow the Americans to approach the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the Dutch East Indies became a buffer zone to prevent other powers from coveting the Indian Ocean.

However, the Japanese navy's power grew too quickly. Even the Americans ceded Mindanao to prevent Japan from causing trouble in the Panama Canal issue. In fact, the Americans may have been using the Japanese to test the British bottom line in Southeast Asia. After all, while the British were condoning the Dutch expansion in Southeast Asia, they were also hindering the route for American capital to enter the East Indies.

For American capital, the most interesting resource in the East Indies was oil. However, apart from giving preferential treatment to the British, the Dutch had been obstructing American capital from obtaining oil exploration rights in the East Indies, which made American capital very dissatisfied with the differential treatment by the Dutch East Indies government.

While the presence of the Japanese in Southeast Asia threatened American dominance in the Philippines, the Americans believed it also disrupted the balance of power in the region. They argued that the Dutch might not be able to resist the demands of the more greedy Japanese, and American capital could enter the East Indies through the opening created by the Japanese.

After Japan acquired Mindanao, Japan and the Netherlands clashed several times over Bali and Sulawesi. However, with British oversight, Japan ultimately conceded, forcing the Dutch to curb their ambitions of annexing the islands by force. Following the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, the Dutch believed that if Bali and Sulawesi were not quickly incorporated into the Dutch East Indies, the islands might indeed fall into Japanese hands.

Although the Dutch were not powerful enough, they were experienced in the great power rivalry in Europe. They realized that Britain was withdrawing from the global economy and trying to concentrate its efforts on dealing with the crisis in Europe. Therefore, Britain's deterrence against Japan was increasingly likely to remain just talk. Once the Japanese used force to test Britain's bottom line on the East Indies issue, then Dutch rule in the East Indies would really be in trouble.

Therefore, after the Hague secret mission, the Dutch, while simultaneously stirring up the Korean issue, began their annexation of the Bonne Sultanate on Sulawesi. The Netherlands judged that Japan at this time would be unable to interfere with their actions, as doing so would only further inflame international discontent with Japan.

The Japanese government was indeed afraid of the internationalization of the North Korean issue. Therefore, Makino's first goal in going to Beijing was to request that China and Japan hold closed-door consultations to prevent other powers from interfering in the negotiations.

On this issue, Beijing and Wuhan held different positions. Beijing believed that countries like Britain and France should act as arbitrators, since China was not in a dominant position against Japan and it was difficult to guarantee that Japan would not break the agreement once the storm had passed. For the Beiyang government officials, they were not afraid of losing face, but they were afraid of taking responsibility. They worried that they could not ensure that the agreement would be implemented in the end, so they needed the endorsement of the great powers.

The Wuhan side partially agreed with the Japanese government's suggestion. They were not afraid that the Japanese government would not abide by the agreement, but the intervention of the great powers in the border negotiations would cause China to lose its autonomy in foreign relations. If the great powers raised objections to China's borders at every turn, wouldn't China become a protectorate of the great powers?

However, while agreeing that the great powers did not need to endorse the Sino-Japanese agreement, Wuhan believed that the Koreans should participate in the negotiations as an independent party. In other words, this negotiation was not a Sino-Japanese consultation, but a consultation among China, Japan, and Korea.

Makino could not accept the Chinese proposals, whether from Beijing or Wuhan, so he could only communicate with the Chinese side repeatedly. The Beiyang Fleet was the first to abandon its own position because Makino indicated that Japan would provide the Beiyang Fleet with a loan to strengthen its military power. Yuan Shikai also realized that other countries were not very interested in the Korean issue. The British were only willing to morally support the Sino-Japanese negotiations on the Korean issue, but refused to acknowledge that the Korean Peninsula was an international issue.

Yuan Shikai realized that Britain did not actually want to see peaceful coexistence between China and Japan, but rather hoped that the Korean issue would become a long-term conflict between China and Japan. However, this would actually have the greatest impact on the Beiyang government rather than Wuhan, because the Beiyang government controlled southern Manchuria, which was not only close to the Korean railway, but its coastline was also under threat from the Japanese navy. If China and Japan could not coexist peacefully, the Beiyang government would be attacked from both sides.

After Yuan Shikai made concessions, the negotiations between Makino and Wuhan finally reached a compromise. Wuhan no longer insisted that Korea participate in the negotiations as an independent country, while Japan recognized that the Korean Independence Army could participate in the negotiations as representatives of the people of Northeast Korea. This compromise meant that Japan acknowledged that Northeast Korea had broken away from the rule of the Korean Empire and had acquired the status of an independent regional government.

This negotiation was primarily a consultation between the Japanese government and the Wuhan side. The main topic of discussion was the form in which this independent northeastern region of Korea should exist and how its borders should be defined. Makino and the Wuhan representatives quickly reached a consensus: the autonomous region of northeastern Korea should become a strategic de-escalation zone between the two sides; Japan would not attack this region, and China would not support North Koreans breaking through this autonomous region to launch attacks on other parts of North Korea.

Japan ceded the coastline of North Hamgyong Province, and representatives of the Korean Independence Army also stated that they would no longer attack the plains of South Hamgyong Province. The southern boundary of the Northeast Autonomous Region of Korea is the edge of the Hamhung Plain, and the western boundary is the Gangnam Mountains and the Myohyang Mountains, which essentially encompasses the plateau of Northeast Korea. The Japanese did not consider this region to be of much value, and giving up this plateau and mountainous area actually saved a lot of troop stationing costs.

However, the draft agreement that Makino sent back to Tokyo still aroused dissatisfaction among army generals such as Yamagata, who believed that Makino had been too weak in the negotiations, which was tantamount to allowing China to cut off a large piece of land from the Korean Peninsula. However, the army had no intention of hindering the conclusion of the agreement, not only because the agreement had been approved by Ito Hirobumi, but also because the army could not afford to internationalize the Korean issue.

Army Minister Tamura explained to the disgruntled hardliners, including Terauchi, that "because of the Hague envoy incident and the Gando incident, the international community has raised questions about whether Japan has the right to occupy the Korean Peninsula. If China submits this to international arbitration, our losses will probably be greater than this agreement."

Tamura's judgment stemmed from the fact that the army was simply unable to suppress the independence movement launched by China and North Korea in North Korea. All the countries needed to do was support China and North Korea to force Japan to cede its interests. In that case, the great powers would inevitably choose to support China and North Korea, just like the countries that supported Japan and China in this Far East war.

Therefore, the key issue is not international pressure, but rather the army's inability to force the Chinese and North Korean troops to retreat from northern Korea. Tamura provided a detailed analysis of the army's combat situation in northern Korea, arguing that "the sophistication of modern rifles allows a single gunman to attack troops unable to establish positions in complex terrain. Unless we prevent our troops from patrolling, casualties are unavoidable."

The complex terrain of the mountainous region in northern North Korea allows the North Koreans to easily shake off our small units after an attack, and even ambush pursuing forces again. Based on the casualty ratios of the battles in northern North Korea that we have collected, to eliminate one North Korean militiaman, we must lose at least one soldier. If it is a regular North Korean unit, then we must sacrifice approximately three soldiers to save one North Korean soldier.

We now have the upper hand in the fighting in North Korea because we have attacked many civilian villages and forced the North Korean militia to engage us head-on by destroying their settlements.

However, this tactic of relying on raids on civilian villages to achieve results is becoming increasingly ineffective because the North Koreans have implemented total militarization in the combat zone. Our sweeps of villages are constantly failing, and the number of times we are attacked on our return journeys is constantly increasing. This war can no longer be sustained. As long as we do not attack the North Koreans' rear areas, the North Koreans can continue to fight us indefinitely.

Chapter 742

Author: Fuchun Mountain Residence Number: 5010 Comments: 0 Update Date: 2023-09-20 12:22:22

After summarizing the characteristics of the Korean War, Army Minister Tamura put forward a very clear conclusion: the army currently lacks experience in fighting small guerrilla forces in complex geographical environments, and without the army's weapons and equipment being significantly superior to those of the guerrilla forces, this endless counterinsurgency operation will only be a quagmire.

Even General Hasegawa, who had just returned from Korea, could not refute Tamura's assertion. As the commander of the Korean Garrison Army, he understood better than anyone else how unpopular the Korean Garrison Army was in Korea. Without the intelligence provided by the Resident-General's Office, they wouldn't even know where to go to suppress the main force of the Righteous Army.

The Koreans in the southern plains and those in the northern mountains have completely different personalities. The former are much more docile, while the latter are somewhat wild. In fact, most of the capable militia are located on the edge of the mountains, with mountain hunters as their backbone. Although these Koreans are armed with outdated matchlock guns, they still cause a lot of trouble for the army.

The North Korean Volunteer Army, which had participated in the war against Russia, was a real adversary for the army. With the military skills they had acquired through training in Tsarist Russia, coupled with the organizational capabilities they had developed in the war against Russia, these volunteers almost always had the upper hand when dealing with the army's encirclement and suppression forces in the northern mountains.

In other words, not many North Korean guards were willing to join the war against Russia, so there were never many elite troops in the Volunteer Army. This is why the North Korean garrison felt that they could eliminate this anti-Japanese armed force of the North Korean people before the Volunteer Army could develop.

However, it is clear from the current fighting in northeastern Korea that the North Korean garrison's assessment was flawed. The Volunteer Army is rapidly becoming more formalized, leading to the loss of several strongholds for the army in the north. Even if Hasegawa wanted to save face for the North Korean garrison, he could not deny Tamura's assessment, because he could not guarantee that the army would be able to deal with the guerrilla forces in the northern mountains of Korea once the war escalated.

At least one point Tamura made was agreed upon by Hasegawa: with China continuing to support the Korean Volunteer Army, the army could not possibly suppress these anti-Japanese elements in the mountainous regions of northern Korea, because the Japanese army's current tactic for eliminating the guerrillas in northern Korea was to destroy local production and try to starve the Koreans who were resisting them by causing food shortages.

However, if the people and soldiers in northern Korea could obtain food from China, this tactic would not be able to succeed, because with China's size, no, even with the food production from Korean immigrants in places like Yanbian, it could support the volunteer army's fighting for a year and a half.

Compared to the resources consumed by the North Korean Volunteer Army, the resources required for the army to fight in the mountainous regions of northern Korea for a year would likely be enough to add two or three more army divisions. This doesn't even include the morale-damaging impact of soldiers being killed and wounded daily, which would completely erode the North Korean garrison's will to remain in North Korea.

This was not Hasegawa's imagination, but rather the Japanese army's aversion to war as they faced heavy casualties in the war against Russia. Tojo Hideaki refused to carry out orders, essentially to save his men's lives and avoid sending them into battles that would consume lives, thus angering the pro-war generals who had initiated the war.

The reason why the army supported the navy in holding a grand naval review was because the navy suffered fewer casualties in this war. They hoped to use the navy's victory to dilute the public's attention to the army's casualties. Although the army officers touted the honor that this war brought to Japan, the lower-ranking soldiers did not have such high awareness. After all, they were the ones fighting on the battlefield with bayonets, not the generals who stood in the rear watching with binoculars.

No matter how much the army's propaganda glorified the honor the war brought to Japan and celebrated the heroes who faced death without flinching on the battlefield, it could not stop the soldiers' aversion to endless fighting. In this respect, the army's upper echelons actually acknowledged that the Chinese were more capable of enduring prolonged warfare than the Japanese. Whether in Wuhan or the Beiyang Fleet, while there might have been differences in courage between the soldiers on both sides, their war-weariness was far lower than that of the Japanese.

A British military observer, after observing the Beiyang Army's combat operations, commented, "The Chinese army has a first-class source of soldiers who are hardworking and can endure hardship, even when carrying only a small amount of food. However, the Chinese army lacks capable officers who can bring out the full potential of these soldiers."

The British certainly had the right to say that, because the Chinese Regiment recruited by the British in Shandong performed far better in battle than the Indian soldiers, and was almost on par with the best troops of the great powers. As a result, the British had to find a way to disband this army after the signing of the Boxer Protocol, because the British were worried that the Chinese Regiment would become a gap for China to absorb advanced European military technology.

However, a German military observer refuted his British counterpart, criticizing: "China also has outstanding officers, such as those who led hundreds of men across the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau into India. Such a feat is almost comparable to Napoleon's crossing of the Alps. What constrains this country is their old traditions and systems. As long as they abandon these outdated customs and systems and respect science like Europe does, then the strength of the Chinese will be revealed to us."

The Germans' praise of China may have been merely a way to annoy the British, but almost all the major powers acknowledged that the current China did not represent its true strength. The various treaties they signed with the Qing Dynasty could not actually be maintained in the long run. Once the country began to regain its historical status, the treaties imposed on China that were unfavorable to it would be impossible to enforce, because the major powers had no ability to force such a China to comply.

From a certain perspective, everything the great powers are doing to China is actually undermining the Westphalian Treaty system. They are trying to force a major power to relinquish its fundamental interests and bow down to a group of small countries that are not powerful enough to suppress it. The Westphalian Treaty system exists on the basis of not infringing on the core interests of major powers.

Therefore, after witnessing the changes in Wuhan, the Germans concluded that the unequal treaties signed between China and Germany were unsustainable. Rather than waiting for the Chinese to propose their dissolution, they reasoned that it was better to proactively dissolve these treaties before China had grown stronger, thereby gaining the Chinese trust. The rise of a great power inevitably brings about significant geopolitical changes, and Germany needs to seize opportunities within these changes to alter its weak position in the international order.

Of course, the Japanese army had no way of knowing about the discussions within German political and economic circles. All they were clear about was this: if they could not cut off China's support for the Korean Volunteer Army, Japan would not be able to quell the armed independence movement in northern Korea. However, before the Korean Peninsula was fully assimilated, they had no chance of winning a war with China.

In Tamura's view, even if Japan fully assimilates the Korean Peninsula, it would be foolish to wage a full-scale war against China. In fact, Japan can only hope that the internal divisions in China will continue, so that Japan can gain some supporters in northern China, similar to the Khitan's balance of power over the various small states in the Central Plains in Chinese history.

However, Tamura's proposals were considered too conservative by the younger generation of the army. Even the Choshu faction, which supported the continental policy, was seen as moderate by these younger members. This was because Yamagata and others' continental policy was actually aimed at occupying the Manchurian and Mongol regions beyond the Great Wall. Since Manchuria and Mongol regions were not traditionally within the sphere of influence of the Han Chinese in Chinese history, separating them would not provoke too much opposition from the Chinese.

Of course, these younger officers have virtually no say in the current army; power still rests with the Choshu faction and those closely associated with them. For instance, while Hasegawa was dissatisfied with Tamura's peaceful resolution of the Korean issue, he still expressed his obedience to Tamura's decision because Japan simply couldn't afford a major war with China.

Although the army's top brass opposed a peaceful resolution to the Korean issue, they joined forces to suppress the younger officers' advocacy for escalating the war, stating that while respecting the army's position, they would not violate the agreement signed between the cabinet and China.

Meanwhile, Hayashi Nobuyoshi had already boarded a passenger ship bound for Tianjin. As a liaison officer for the Japanese Navy, he was to travel to Tianjin ahead of schedule to communicate with the Chinese Navy regarding military exercises. In fact, the Navy preferred him to serve as the advance staff officer for the joint military exercises, but he declined the position because he felt that he was not good at naval tactics. Therefore, he recommended his contemporary, Hori Teikichi.

This move surprised many staff officers. The chief staff officer was actually the chief staff officer in charge of specific staff work. Although the final decision-making power was in the hands of the fleet commander and the chief of staff, the chief staff officer decided what options to choose for them. If the plans proposed by other staff officers could not be approved by the chief staff officer, they would not even have the opportunity to be submitted.

It was only after Akiyama Saneyuki served as the advance staff officer for the joint fleet in the operation against Russia that he truly established his authority as the brain of the navy. The fact that everyone advocated for Hayashi Shin-yi to serve as the advance staff officer for this military exercise was actually a further confirmation of Hayashi Shin-yi's leadership ability in the navy; otherwise, given the number of years he graduated from the naval academy, it would have been impossible for him to obtain this position.

Although Lin Xinyi promoted the implementation of this military exercise, he was not very interested in the specific business of the exercise. Naval high-ranking officers such as Shibayama Yahachi also knew that Lin Xinyi sought the position of liaison officer in order to further promote the establishment of the Asian Joint Fleet in the later stage, so they would not bind him to the position of staff officer.

Of course, while Hayashi Shin-yi declined the position of first staff officer, others showed ambition for it. However, Shibayama Yahachi ultimately voted for Hori Teikichi, recommended by Hayashi Shin-yi, and stated, "The purpose of this military exercise is not to show off the navy's strength. In fact, the navy does not need to demonstrate its strength in the face of North Korea and China. What we need is cooperation with China, and incidentally, to train young people. After all, there shouldn't be any major naval wars in the future, so military exercises become the best battlefield for young officers to learn command and control. Therefore, it is necessary to have young officers serve as first staff officers."

As the commander-in-chief of the military exercise, Shibayama Yahachi's opinion was of greater importance. As a result, Hori Teikichi ultimately defeated a group of senior and experienced officers to obtain the position of staff officer. This also indicated that the influence of the Reform Society within the Navy had begun to affect the power of personnel appointments in the fleet.

China attaches great importance to this trilateral naval exercise. Of course, the Beiyang and Wuhan navies have different focuses. The Beiyang navies are trying to establish a close and trusting relationship with Japan through this exercise, while the Wuhan navies know that the exercise is part of a political plan to reclaim Qingdao. Therefore, neither side is willing to give up its representation of the Chinese navy.

After the First Sino-Japanese War, the Beiyang Fleet as a whole effectively ceased to exist. The Nanyang Fleet and local fleets, which had been suppressed by the Beiyang Fleet, began to have opportunities to develop. As a result, the Beiyang Fleet disintegrated, and the Qing Dynasty's navy was divided into two independent units: the cruiser fleet and the Yangtze River fleet, which did not interfere with each other.

Most of the naval officers in the cruiser fleet were from Fujian, mainly graduates of the Fujian Naval Academy. The Yangtze River Fleet, on the other hand, retained many remnants of the Beiyang Fleet. For example, Li Yuanhong was a graduate of the Beiyang Naval Academy, and most of the Yangtze River Fleet officers he hired were his classmates or juniors. With the help of the Germans, the Wuhan Naval Engineering Academy was established.

Although Li Yuanhong and Yuan Shikai shared the Huai Clique background, Li Yuanhong refused Yuan Shikai's attempts to win him over. Faced with an absolute disparity in strength, personal connections were utterly meaningless. While Li Yuanhong felt he wasn't valued within the Wuhan system—after all, he was the founder of the Wuhan New Army—in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, built upon the Wuhan New Army and the Wuhan Workers' Militia, he could only be a local military commander, unable to enter the core decision-making level of the Military Commission.

Even so, Li Yuanhong rejected Yuan Shikai's attempts to win him over, because he felt that Yuan Shikai's suggestion that he control Jiangsu was simply wishful thinking. Although he was transferred to Nanjing by the Wuhan Military Commission and had control of the most powerful military force in Jiangsu, the system of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was completely different from that of the Qing Dynasty's New Army. In the Qing Dynasty's New Army, the appointment of officers was greatly influenced by the commanding officer. It could be said that the commander of a division of the New Army could completely control the troops through the officers he appointed. This was also the key to Yuan Shikai's ability to control the Beiyang divisions.

However, in the system of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the training and appointment of military commanders were decided by the Military Commission, while the daily life of soldiers and the logistics of the army were supervised by political cadres. With the authorization of the Military Commission, he could command the troops under him very easily, even more easily than when he commanded the Second Division of the New Army in Wuhan, which he had established, because he had the will of the Military Commission behind him, and the officers under him could not resist at all.

However, if he wanted to act beyond the authorization of the Military Commission, the political commissar could easily relieve him of his command and imprison him, without any unrest in the army. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was an armed force under the leadership of the Party, not Li Yuanhong's private army. Yuan Shikai believed that as long as he defected to the Beiyang Army, he could pull his troops out of Wuhan and then seize control of Jiangsu. This was clearly still rooted in the impression of the New Army from the late Qing Dynasty.

Given Yuan Shikai's lack of understanding of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, Li Yuanhong was not optimistic about the future of the Beiyang clique. Moreover, given that Jiangsu was a land of wealth and resources, would the Beiyang government tolerate him occupying it? If it weren't for Wuhan sending troops to maintain order in Jiangsu, the Beiyang army would have already marched south to Jiangsu. Therefore, Yuan Shikai was merely using Jiangsu, a territory that was unlikely to be handed over to him, to deceive himself into building Wuhan.

Li Yuanhong, who genuinely harbored resentment towards the Military Commission, was not so foolish as to be deceived by Yuan Shikai and make a fool of himself for a moment of impulsiveness. Therefore, no matter how Yuan Shikai tried to win him over, Li Yuanhong kept his distance.

In the struggle for control of the Chinese Navy, the old Beiyang Fleet faction led by Li Yuanhong and the Fujianese were locked in a fierce battle. Li Yuanhong had been trying to merge the Yangtze River Fleet and the cruiser fleet to restore a unified naval command system, but Yuan Shikai was clearly unwilling to let the Yangtze River Fleet annex the cruiser fleet, and the Fujianese in the cruiser fleet were also not in agreement.

The cruiser fleet felt that the Yangtze River Fleet, under the leadership of Wuhan, should be subordinate to the leadership of the Beijing Naval Department, which was actually under the control of the cruiser fleet. The cruiser fleet was quite envious of the logistical support system of the Yangtze River Fleet.

After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Fujian Shipbuilding Bureau ceased operations, interrupting the talent training system for the cruiser fleet. However, the Yangtze River Fleet, leveraging Wuhan's strong industrial manufacturing capabilities, established the Wuhan Naval Engineering Academy, whose first three classes alone had over a thousand students—far more than the six hundred graduates trained by the Fuzhou Naval Academy over several decades.

Therefore, the Beijing Naval Department tried to restore the teaching at the Fuzhou Naval Academy on the one hand, and wanted to take over the Wuhan Naval Engineering Academy on the other hand, so as to turn it into its own talent training base.

In this collaboration with Japan, the Beijing Naval Department also wanted to exclude the Yangtze River Fleet, since it was a naval military exercise, and why would the Yangtze River Fleet be involved? In reality, the cruiser fleet's objective was to acquire two damaged Russian warships from Japan to bolster its capabilities.

However, Wuhan refused to compromise, and the Beiyang Army was unwilling to spend money to repair the two Russian ships donated by Japan to the Navy. Duan and Feng believed that if Sino-Japanese relations did not deteriorate, these two large ships would be useless, but if relations did deteriorate, they would be of little use. The Japanese sank the Russian ships, and the Japanese repaired the Russian ships. If a war broke out, would the Japanese not understand the combat capabilities of these two warships? Therefore, the Navy compromised with Wuhan and decided that both sides would send personnel to participate.

Chapter 743

Author: Fuchun Mountain Residence Number: 5075 Comments: 0 Update Date: 2023-09-21 12:36:50

As the naval representative sent by the Korean Empire, Ahn Myung-geun stood by the window of the conference room and looked out. He could see the Dedication Church, a Chinese-style Orthodox church, which was shaded by a large tree. After all, the church was completed during the Yongzheng period and is now almost two hundred years old.

In the Boxer Protocol following the Boxer Rebellion, the Russians significantly expanded their legation grounds in Beijing, reaching an area of ​​100 mu (approximately 6.7 hectares). However, the Russian legation in Beijing, built with substantial investment, was reclaimed by the Chinese after only a few days due to the outbreak of war.

Originally, after the Boxer Protocol, the entire Dongjiaomin Lane area was carved out by the foreign powers to form a rectangular legation district, which became a de facto international concession. The legations not only controlled the security of the area but also forcibly obtained the right to levy taxes.

However, with the outbreak of the Sino-Russian War, this state-within-a-state situation established in Beijing was forcibly broken by Wuhan. In addition to the Russian legation being confiscated by the Wuhan army, the American legation also had to hand over the barracks near the west side. Although the British legation retained the western region it had occupied during the war, it also had to withdraw most of the troops from the barracks in the northwest and lease the area to the Beiyang Army.

By 1909, the Legation Quarter in Dongjiaomin Lane had become a complex situation. The legation could only control the area east of the Imperial River. The area west of the river had actually been taken back by China. Furthermore, the legation agreed to withdraw its troops from Beijing, leaving only a small number of guards to protect the security of the legation and prohibiting its own soldiers from carrying weapons out of the legation.

In An Minggen's view, if the Beiyang clique had not been so incompetent, the legation area west of the Imperial River could have been taken over by the Chinese government as well. However, in terms of courage, the Beiyang clique was indeed inferior to Wuhan.

The reason the diplomatic corps agreed to withdraw the troops stationed in Beijing was the strong offensive capability shown by the Wuhan troops when they attacked the Russian legation. This made the diplomatic corps realize that they could not resist the Chinese army's attack with a small force, and it would be a joke to expect the Tianjin troops to come to their aid. Rather than letting these soldiers become hostages of the Chinese in Beijing, it was better to evacuate them. After all, the army is not a diplomatic personnel and cannot enjoy the protection of diplomatic rights.

As a North Korean, Ahn Myung-geun was naturally moved to see the Chinese regain their lost national sovereignty, as he also hoped that North Korea could do the same. Like Ahn Jung-geun, one of the few North Koreans who had followed Lim Shin-yi through Tibet and India, Ahn Myung-geun had a deeper understanding of the issue of national and ethnic independence.

For example, he and Ahn Jung-geun used to believe that defending the country was the duty of every citizen. After all, without a country, where would the Koreans be? But after seeing the lives and apathy of the lower classes in Tibet and India, if the people at the very bottom of society cannot realize that the survival of the country is related to their own interests, then they will have no concept of the country. They will only think that it is a change of rulers. For them, is there really any difference between the rule of the Japanese and the rule of the Korean Yangban aristocracy?

Although Lin Xinyi was Japanese, An Minggen truly realized that there was no real conflict between him and Lin Xinyi. The real conflict lay between the lower classes of Korea and the Yangban aristocracy. As long as the conflict between them was not resolved, even without the Japanese, other powers would still try to take over Korea, because a society where the upper and lower classes were mutually hostile could not maintain the organization of a country.

It was the Koreans who lost Korea first, and only then did Japan invade, not the other way around. Having realized this, Ahn Myung-geun truly understood what kind of power was needed for Korean independence—power that didn't come from the pity of China or other powers, but from the awakening of the Korean people.

Instead of going to North Korea with his cousin to establish a volunteer army, he accepted Lin Xinyi's suggestion and joined the Korean Empire Navy in order to establish an underground organization in South Korea and ensure that the independence struggle in South Korea would not be annihilated by the Japanese army and Korean collaborators.

This was actually a very painful battle, which made Ahn Myung-geun lose hope that the Korean independence struggle could be victorious. After the signing of the first Japan-Korea Protection Agreement, the Korean Empire Army, which the Korean people had raised with a lot of tax money, was used for the first time not in foreign wars, but under the orders of the Japanese to suppress local militias. Therefore, the Koreans wrote poems in anger, cursing: "Ten years of raising a fierce army, only to slaughter militias."

Although the Japanese forcibly disbanded the army during the second Japan-South Korea agreement, which aroused resistance from some soldiers, Ahn Myung-geun never saw any hope for Korean independence. He felt that there was no class in the country capable of leading the nation to stand up again.

For example, a figure like Tian Junyi could defeat the Manchu army with the support of the working class and some peasants in Wuhan, and eventually establish a new regime that led China to a new beginning. However, he could not see such a person or such a united populace in Korea.

The yangban nobles of Korea, or those like Yi Wan-yong who groveled before the powerful, cared nothing for whether the country was occupied, as long as they could maintain their power. However, a few yangban landlords who advocated national independence regarded leading independence as a privilege of the yangban. They were more wary of the righteous armies spontaneously organized by the villagers than of the Japanese. Many of these righteous armies were betrayed by so-called famous Confucian scholars.

While the lower classes in North Korea possessed a high degree of patriotism, they were utterly clueless about whom to listen to. As for the merchants who had suffered under oppression during the Joseon Dynasty, they were completely bought off by the Japanese, becoming spies used by the Japanese to control the populace. Faced with this situation, the North Korean intellectuals who had been indignant at the signing of the Japan-South Korea agreement gradually became numb and indifferent. They felt that struggling was pointless and would only make the North Koreans suffer more.

After experiencing all of this, An Minggen truly understood why Tian Junyi and other high-ranking members of the Workers' Party had such unwavering faith in Lin Xinyi. It was because Lin Xinyi had rescued them from despair and shown them the right path to unite the Chinese people. Just like him now, he no longer cared about Lin Xinyi's identity, but rather about the path of independence Lin Xinyi had chosen for North Korea.

This was not blind trust. After the volunteer army raised the banner of independence in northeastern Korea, the Korean national consciousness finally began to unite the forces of all social strata. The previous doubts about whether Korea could be independent began to fade away with the successive victories of the Korean Independence Army in northeastern Korea.

An Minggen knew very well that although his cousin was outstanding, it was impossible for him to achieve this. Without the support of the Chinese, the Korean Independence Army could not have developed to this point. The reason why the Chinese were willing to support the Korean Independence Army was because the Koreans had previously supported China's war against Russia. It was this friendship forged in blood that enabled the Chinese to stand firm against the threat of Japan and become the backing of the Korean Independence Army.

The one who established this strategy was Lim Shin-eui, not Ahn Jung-geun. In fact, before this, the Korean yangban nobles thought that a war between China and Russia would be detrimental to China, so Korea could expand its territory on the border, since the Russians wouldn't care about losing a little territory in Manchuria, which they had just annexed. If things had gone according to the ideas of these Korean yangban nobles, then today it would be China and Japan jointly strangling the Korean independence army.

As a Japanese, Hayashi Shin-yi not only did not entice Koreans to turn against the Chinese, but also preserved a glimmer of hope for Korean independence. An Myung-geun, therefore, could no longer question Hayashi Shin-yi's intentions, which further strengthened his belief in labor solidarity. He believed that Hayashi Shin-yi's propositions were correct, and that the foundation of Korean independence lay in the unity of the working classes of Asian countries, not in the independent struggle of the Korean nation itself.

As An Minggen stared blankly out the window, his deputy, Shen Shunsheng, walked up to him and told him, "The Japanese and Chinese representatives have come together."

Shin Soon-seong was a student in Japan, but not a graduate of the naval academy. He went there earlier, before the Japanese navy opened its naval education system to Koreans, so he studied at a civilian school specializing in merchant ship navigation. Even so, Shin Soon-seong was still one of the more modern talents among the yangban aristocracy who understood modern ships, far superior to those old-fashioned scholars who only knew the Four Books and Five Classics.

So when the Korean Empire planned to build its own navy, Shin Soon-seong was appointed captain of the Yangmu, a warship converted from a Japanese cargo ship. Later, he was appointed captain of the Gwangje, which was also converted from a cargo ship, but because of its better internal facilities, it became the exclusive flagship of the royal family and nobles. Shin Soon-seong was regarded as a reliable person and transferred to the Gwangje.

This shows that the upper echelons of the Korean Empire did not actually have a fixed plan for military development. Rather, it was merely a way to demonstrate their willingness to innovate and consolidate their rule. They did not genuinely want Korea to confront the great powers.

Shin Soon-seong, as one of the earliest members of the Yangban aristocracy to embrace modern learning, did not have much desire to reform the Joseon system, but his hope that Joseon would enter modern society was similar to that of progressive intellectuals. Therefore, he gradually became a supporter of Ahn Myung-geun in the navy.

Of course, the Korean Empire's navy was also in a precarious state at the time. In fact, if it weren't for the insistence of the Japanese navy, the Korean Empire's navy, like its army, would have been disbanded. This incident caused the yangban nobles who held positions in the navy to leave, fearing retribution from the Japanese. The remaining Koreans naturally united, their goal being to maintain the existence of the Korean Empire's navy as much as possible, thus proclaiming that the Korean Empire was not yet extinct.

An Minggen understood very well why the Japanese Navy allowed the Korean Imperial Navy to continue existing. On the one hand, it was to obtain a share of the budget from Korea. If the Korean Imperial Navy were disbanded, then the entire Korean budget would be controlled by the Japanese Army, which was obviously not something the Japanese Navy wanted to see. On the other hand, it was because of the Asian alliance that Hayashi Shin-yi was planning. The Japanese Navy needed a third-party facade to dispel any suspicions about cooperation between Japan and China.

Of course, apart from Lin Xinyi, the Japanese did not take the Korean Empire Navy seriously. Although the Korean Empire Navy had not been disbanded, its jurisdiction had been transferred from the Korean Empire government to the Japanese Navy's Korean Fleet, which became a patrol fleet used by the Japanese Navy to patrol the waters near the Korean Peninsula and investigate smuggling.

An Minggen and Shen Shunsheng turned their gazes to the door of the conference room, where they saw a young Japanese soldier and several Chinese generals walk in. An Minggen immediately stepped forward to greet the Japanese soldier, which surprised Shen Shunsheng, because in Korea, An Minggen had always disdained to salute the Japanese first. Although this had caused dissatisfaction among many Japanese officers, they ultimately could do nothing about it.

Lin Xinyi greeted An Minggen with pleasure and introduced him to the Chinese general beside him: "This is Major An, my junior from the Naval Academy. It's quite a coincidence to meet him here. Major An, this is General Li Yuanhong, the commander of the Chinese Yangtze River Fleet. You should get to know him too."

Seeing the Japanese, Koreans, and Li Yuanhong chatting intimately, Zheng Rucheng, as the representative of the Navy, immediately felt uneasy, because the relationship between the three seemed too close, which made him, as the representative of the Navy, feel excluded.